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As an expert witness testifying in a medical malprac-
tice suit, you are asked if the defendant’s performance
fell below the standard of care. You are testifying on
behalf of the defendant physician whom you supervised
briefly during his residency. Your proper response re-
quires reference to context, an understanding of com-
plex physiologic relationships in the natural history of
the disease, and an appreciation of the risks and benefits
of therapy accessible to neither your attorney interro-
gator nor the laymen of the jury. A simple yes or no will
not suffice. Under intensely pressured questioning by
the plaintiff’s attorney, you ask, “What exactly do you
mean by the standard of care?” The judge interrupts.
He makes it clear that the expert witnesses are expected
to understand the meaning of their testimony and
demands that you “tell the court what you understand
the standard of care to mean.” Which of the following
is your best response?
A. Whatever the expert witnesses determine it to be. It can
differ among different expert witnesses in the same trial
or when the same witness discusses different stages of
care.
B. Whichever expert’s testimony the jury believes.
C. In retrospect, whatever therapy would have resulted in
the best clinical outcome.
D. Whatever a majority of physicians would have done if
faced with the same situation.
E. It is complex, poorly understood by physicians, and has
most value when unbiased expert witnesses define it by
reference to evidence-based literature.
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doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2004.08.024The legal and medical systems are superbly coherent
intellectual constructs, theoretically. Problems with their
application arise when physicians and attorneys whose
thinking is less than perfectly coherent use the systems
imperfectly. Oftentimes, the learned professionals, upon
using them imperfectly, will claim the fault lies in the
system. Despite some inevitable lapses, medicine and law
provide society with the best available resources for resolv-
ing some of its most complex problems. The 2 disciplines
directly confront one another in the medical tort arena.
The 3 legal criteria that must be satisfied for the plaintiff
to be awarded damages are logical and direct but often
manipulated: (1) The patient must have suffered compen-
sable injuries or death; (2) these injuries were the direct
result of the defendant physician’s treatment or failure to
treat; and (3) in the provision of therapy, the physician did
not meet his or her contractual professional responsibility.
The physician’s contractual responsibility has 4 compo-
nents: there must be a reasonable certainty that the patient
will be clinically improved in some manner, the patient’s
best interests must be paramount, the surgeon must per-
form according to “the best in his power,” and the “best in
his power” must have reached sufficiency.1 Physicians
gather, evaluate, introduce, and implement medical knowl-
edge to clarify the patient’s disease, injury, or disability and
formulate therapeutic strategies. Because of biological vari-
ation, shortcomings in medical science, unanticipated cor-
relates, and the huge volume of information needing to be
considered, the practice of medicine is never fully mastered
and there is always some risk that therapy will harm rather
than heal. The conditions for malpractice come about when
physician’s actions depart significantly from those most
other competent physicians would be likely to select and
administer on the basis of the amassed published experience
of the profession. It follows that a practitioner who fails to
maintain an adequate fund of current knowledge, who fails
to practice conscientiously, or who exceeds his or her
abilities, practices under conditions ripe for untoward pa-
tient consequences and redress within the tort system.
The critical legal benchmark in determining a physi-
cian’s failure to fulfill his or her professional responsibility is
the concept of the standard of care. The standard of care is
breached whenever the physician fails to fulfill the minimal
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and to exercise minimal levels of judgment.2 This concept,
termed the “competence-based national nationstandard of
care,” recognizes uniform requirements nationally for ad-
missions to medical school, medical school curricula, resi-
dency training, and specialty boards. The quality of medical
care proposed by this national standard should show min-
imal geographic variability with respect to such key com-
ponents as the thoroughness of examinations, indicated
laboratory tests ordered, consultations requested, therapy
provided, and the promptness of administration of therapy.
The resources-based caveat to the national standard slightly
modifies its definition of the physician’s duty to accommo-
date geographic variability in the availability of specialized
medical facilities, services, and options as are “reasonably
available.”2 A physician practicing without the availability
of advanced radiologic equipment cannot be expected to
have promptly obtained computed tomography or mag-
netic resonance imaging. However, there is no exemption
for failing to refer to a more suitable facility or specialist
when the patient’s condition demands it. Thus, a physi-
cian’s practices are judged on the basis of his or her special-
ty’s standards allowing for local variations in access to
resources. The courts permit additional legal latitude in the
respectable minority rule, recognizing that science is not a
democratic process nor is medicine unfailingly uniform.
The appropriate therapy for a specific disease is not decided
by majority vote, nor do majorities dictate the standard of
care when equipoise exists; various standards of care can be
reasonably established by several groups of competent phy-
sicians practicing independently of one another and not
necessarily in a manner entirely consistent with the majority
of practioners within a given specialty. Continual major
scientific advances in clinical medicine historically have
brought about many such situations.
That, however, is not the complete story. Several court
cases have established that “should customary medical
practice fail to keep pace with developments and advances
in medical science, adherence to custom might constitute a
failure to exercise ordinary care.”2 Courts are beginning to
hold physicians responsible for keeping up with the litera-
ture. The failure of the medical community and of individ-
ual physicians to adapt their practices in a timely fashion is
no defense if substantial evidence supports the judgment
that the prevailing practice should have changed. Particu-
larly with the maturation of the digital age and its rapid
dissemination of information, the standards of care are
increasingly defined by the best available evidence rather
than the local practice standard or the idiosyncratic opin-
ions of expert witnesses. The world’s medical literature is
instantly available to anyone with a computer and a modi-
cum of computer expertise.
The ethical expert medical witness understands that the
standard of care should not be solely represented by the
views of a particular well-compensated “expert” witness
relative to his or her personal practice habits, although that
is a common courtroom practice. Reading depositions of
surgical “experts” taken under oath emphasizes the latitudein scientifically unsupported pronouncements currently
flooding the courts. More to the point, standards of care are
routinely interpreted oppositely by expert witnesses for the
defense and plaintiff because counsel for both sides devotes
considerable effort to screening and disqualifying consul-
tant experts whose views do not represent the “standard”
the attorney needs to make the case. The attorney is doing
his or her job. The plethora of physician expert witnesses
available to give programmed testimony is to the shame of
the medical profession. The experts are expected to repre-
sent acceptable nationwide medical practice on the basis of
their combined knowledge of their practice, the relevant
evidence-based literature, daily interactions with col-
leagues, and participation at national professional meet-
ings. The subjective elements of their testimony should be
limited to an assessment of whether there was a significant
variance from a well-known and established standard of
care and whether clinical circumstances warranted the vari-
ance. Option A is therefore not an acceptable response;
individually adjusting the standard of care for purposes of
advocacy is grossly unethical with negative repercussions
for patients and the profession alike.
Spencer and Guice3 noted these inherent system flaws
when “expert witnesses are actively pursued for their views,
their presentation style, and their willingness to tailor their
testimony according to the particular needs of the case.”
Attorneys understand that the determination of malprac-
tice is made neither by them nor by their experts; it is made
by a lay jury weighing the credibility of often contradictory
testimonies by medical experts. The most important char-
acteristics for success in the courtroom, therefore, are a
medical expert’s personal manner and believability. Sadly,
option B is true in a practical sense but it exposes yet
another theoretical fault of the legal system. It must be
discarded as a choice for a definition of the standard of care.
The medical expert who uses highly developed debating
skills to convince jurors of a specious scientific opinion
clearly is behaving unethically.
If Option C were correct, more than half of the com-
plications plaguing the practice of medicine would be clas-
sified legitimately as malpractice. Every surgeon who has
attended a D & C conference has heard that “the retros-
pectoscope is always 100% accurate.” Knowing the out-
come and its effect on retrospective reasoning is termed
hindsight bias; it enables the evaluator to connect the causal
dots for a now-completed effect. Hindsight bias is likely to
result in hypercritical reviews because clinical error is ex-
pected and searched for when the evaluator knows from the
start that there has been a bad clinical outcome. A study by
Dawson et al4 found that criticisms of physician reviewers
of identical medical case histories varied significantly de-
pending on what the clinician evaluators were told about
the outcomes. A subsequent study showed that the more
experienced surgeons were the least influenced by hind-
sight bias, suggesting that this group would provide the
most reliable and consistent expert testimony.5 Surgeons
need only remember the last spirited D & C conference
they attended for a personal verification of the phenome-
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comes negatively. Accordingly, Hugh and Tracy6 recom-
mend that outcomes be omitted from experts’ review
material until after they declare their opinion of the care.
Although conventional medical wisdom is usually cor-
rect, option D is not acceptable. As noted earlier, scientific
medial practice is not a democratic process; judgments
grounded in evidence-based medicine are not made au-
thoritative by majority opinion. Advances in medicine have
often spent years in the obscurity of minority opinion.
Option E should guide the surgeon-witness in this case.
The concept of the standard of care covers the range of
clinical judgments, supported by the best available evidence
at the time of the case. That evidence, and the judgment
derived from it, must strongly indicate that the procedure
or other form of clinical management in question was
reliably expected (a) to be life-saving or to prevent serious
or irreversible disease, injury, or handicap to the patient and
(b) to involve manageable and acceptable risks that the
surgeon took appropriate measures to minimize.7
The standard of care concept is currently embodied by
physicians as a discredited legal term that has been long
ignored by the medical profession. It is nevertheless at the
center of medicine’s opportunity to improve and formulate
a sustained, preventive ethics response to the professional
liability crisis. Reliable judgments about what should be
considered a standard of care are not adversarial; they are
scientific and should be guided by the standards of high-
quality evidence-based medicine prevailing at the time the
case occurred. Such judgments should be based on cur-
rently available high-quality evidence-based disease man-
agement protocols and other clinical guidelines as well asrigorous review of current peer-reviewed literature, a re-
view that categorically requires an unbiased expert witness.
The American Association for the Advancement of Science
offers independent experts to the courts to fix the meretri-
cious testimony of mercenary experts.8 The federal courts
have begun to accept this approach, with the creation of
“science panels” for expert testimony.9 Physicians should
take the lead in advocating a similar approach in medical
malpractice cases, thereby eliminating a great deal of the
injustice to which both plaintiffs and defendants are sub-
jected by the existing system.
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